While this historic event seemed to be a victory for Jews, it also marked the beginning of more violence with the Arabs. Following the announcement of an independent Israel, five Arab nations—Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria , and Lebanon—immediately invaded the region in what became known as the Arab-Israeli War. Civil war broke out throughout all of Israel, but a cease-fire agreement was reached in As part of the temporary armistice agreement, the West Bank became part of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip became Egyptian territory.
Numerous wars and acts of violence between Arabs and Jews have ensued since the Arab-Israeli War. Some of these include:. Clashes between Israelis and Palestinians are still commonplace. Key territories of land are divided, but some are claimed by both groups. For instance, they both cite Jerusalem as their capital. Both groups blame each other for terror attacks that kill civilians. Several countries have pushed for more peace agreements in recent years.
Many have suggested a two-state solution but acknowledge that Israelis and Palestinians are unlikely to settle on borders. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has supported the two-state solution but has felt pressure to change his stance. Netanyahu has also been accused of encouraging Jewish settlements in Palestinian areas while still backing a two-state solution.
In a visit to Israel in May , U. President Donald Trump urged Netanyahu to embrace peace agreements with Palestinians. And in May , the U. Palestinians responded with protests at the Gaza-Israel border, which were met with Israeli force resulting in the deaths of dozens of protesters.
While Israel has been plagued by unpredictable war and violence in the past, many national leaders and citizens are hoping for a secure, stable nation in the future. Creation of Israel, Office of the Historian, U. Department of State. Israel: The World Factbook: U. Central Intelligence Agency. Palestine: Growing Recognition: Al Jazeera.
But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us! Subscribe for fascinating stories connecting the past to the present. Despite the numerical superiority of the Arab armies, Israel defended itself each time and won. After each war, Israeli army withdrew from most of the areas it captured see maps. This is unprecedented in World history and shows Israel's willingness to reach peace even at the risk of fighting for its very existence each time anew.
Including Judea and Samaria, Israel is only 40 miles wide. Thus, Israel can be crossed from the Mediterranean coast to the Eastern border at the Jordan river within two hours of driving. This drawing by Dr. Semion Natliashvili depicts the modern ingathering of the Jewish People after 2, years of Diaspora. The center image of the picture shows a young and old man attired in a prayer shawl and reading from a Torah scroll that has united the Jewish People. The Star of David symbolizes the gathering of the Jewish People from all corners of the world, including Georgia country of birth of the artist , Morocco, Russia, America, China, Ethiopia, Europe and other countries joining together and dancing in celebration.
Other images inside the star symbolize modern Israeli industry, agriculture and military. The images on the margins of the picture symbolize the major threats that the Jewish People faced in Exile starting from the Exodus from Egypt, followed by Romans, Arabs, and culminating in the gas-chambers of the Holocaust in Europe. Written by: Israel Hanukoglu, Ph. Quote from Charles Krauthammer - The Weekly Standard, May 11, "Israel is the very embodiment of Jewish continuity: It is the only nation on earth that inhabits the same land, bears the same name, speaks the same language, and worships the same God that it did 3, years ago.
The Greeks generally allowed the Jews to run their state. The actions of the Greeks led to the initiation of a revolt by the Maccabean family. Thirteen countries voted against it. To be fair, it is definitely true that the UN ignored Arab and Palestinian objections to the plan, in a way that left them disenfranchised and feeling, with reason, that their land had been taken from them without their consent.
But the point is that it was not a European or Western conspiracy. The last British troops in what had been the British Mandate of Palestine lower their flag in Haifa harbor in June Second, Israel's creation was not just a response to the Holocaust: While it is true that Holocaust galvanized global public opinion in support of Jews, and accelerated Jewish immigration to Israel, it is also true that all the factors that led to the creation of Israel were already well in place before the Holocaust happened.
There were centuries of European anti-Semitism, a strongly felt Zionist movement among Jews, many thousands of Jewish immigrants in Palestine, and an international campaign to generate diplomatic support.
In some ways, the Holocaust depressed Jewish immigration, because Nazi governments largely forbade it and because it left Europe with so many fewer Jews to emigrate. The question of how big a role the Holocaust played in leading up to Israel's creation is debated among scholars, but the point is that it was by no means, despite the widespread misconception, the only significant impetus for Israel's creation.
You hear variations of this argument from partisans to the conflict who argue that the other side has an insufficient claim to the land because their nationality is made up. The pro-Palestinian argument is that Israelis are actually European Jews who trumped up the idea of an Israeli identity in order to steal land, but who actually belong in Europe and need to go back.
The pro-Israeli argument is that Palestinians are just Arabs who trumped up the idea of a Palestinian identity in order to claim land they weren't fully using, but who should instead be absorbed into the neighboring Arab states of Jordan and Egypt. There is obviously a real degree of racism implicit in both of these arguments, and both arguments fundamentally ignore the actual experiences of Israelis and Palestinians.
Israelis are in Israel, and not in Europe, in significant part because Europe spent centuries violently rejecting them as not European.
They had little choice but to adopt a distinct national identity, which they began doing in the s. This movement became Zionism. Palestinian youths wave flags at a rally in Rafah, Gaza. Likewise, Palestinians began developing a distinct national identity in the early s , also as a reaction to oppression, in their case the centuries of Ottoman domination. As with Israelis, that sense of a common Palestinian national identity grew into the desire, as is their right, for a state of their own.
While it's true that Palestinians are ethnically Arab, as are many other Middle Easterners, this is not the same as a nationality; the idea of a unified pan-Arab identity is a relatively new phenomenon, and one that faded quickly after its peak in the early s. Both sides argue that they have claims to the land going back centuries. And they both have a plausible case. But the argument over whose family tree goes back further elides that this conversation is much more about modern national identities than about ancient religious roots.
This also misses a fundamental but uncomfortable truth that neither side is eager to admit. Here is that truth: all national identities are, to some extent, artificial. And strong national identities as we know them today are largely a modern phenomenon. The American national identity obviously did not exist years ago; neither did a specifically Nigerian national identity, for example, exist just years ago.
Both are relatively modern inventions, stitched together from prior identities and groupings and land claims. And yet we all agree that the American identity is real and valid and that the Nigerian identity is real and valid.
Similarly, while Israelis and Palestinians do have ancient heritages, there is also some truth to the idea that these identities are in many ways modern inventions. But so are many other national identities.
And here's the thing: the world is organized on an idea called national self-determination, which says people are allowed to determine their own national identity and then organize politically around it. Israelis and Palestinians clearly each see themselves as holding a strong national identity, so the world should respect that. There is certainly hate on the fringes of both Israeli and Palestinian politics, and those fringes are not small.
But the more common feeling among mainstream Israelis and Palestinians could probably be better described as somewhere between apathy and antipathy. The commonly expressed view among Palestinians is not that they wish to see all Jews driven into the sea; it's that they want just and fair treatment of Palestinians, which they see as requiring that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories end and, for many, that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be allowed to return to their former homes in what is now Israel.
They are outraged about the costs occupation imposes on Palestinians, and have next to no faith that Israel will withdraw or generally do the right thing. They believe Israelis will never voluntarily allow them a state. The commonly expressed view among Israelis is that peace would be great in theory, and establishing an independent Palestinian state would be great in theory, but that they have next to no confidence that Palestinians or Palestinian leaders will actually take the necessary steps to get there.
They believe Palestinians will never stop wanting to kill Israelis, and that allowing Palestinians a state would bring unacceptable dangers for Israelis. Both of these views developed over many decades of conflict, broken deals, and lost opportunities. But they really crystallized during what's called the second intifada , in the early s. Palestinians, outraged that the Oslo Peace Process had failed to bring peace and had seemingly institutionalized the occupation, staged mass protests.
Both sides blame one another for the Palestinian protests and Israeli crackdowns that escalated into horrible violence, including Palestinian terrorist attacks and brutal Israeli military assaults.
When it was over, roughly 3, Palestinians and 1, Israelis had been killed. Palestinian youth throw stones at an Israeli tank in , during the second intifada.
Ever since, Israelis have generally believed that peace is desirable but not workable because Palestinians would reject it in favor of violence.
Palestinians, who have seen the smothering force of the occupation greatly deepen since the second intifada, and have seen Israeli settlements in the West Bank grow, increasingly believe that Israelis wish to make the occupation permanent. This does not mean that Israelis and Palestinians broadly hate one another or are racist against one another. The occupation-enforced separation does mean that even outside of the extremist fringes, misunderstanding runs deep and empathy does not.
And the rough history between Israelis and Palestinians has engendered a lot of distrust, but that's not hate. However, this antipathetic relationship does allow the truly hateful, the extremists, to fester on both sides and to exploit the broader mainstream's apathy toward the other side's needs. There is a common trope, especially on the left, that the Israel-Palestine conflict would end overnight if only the US were not so unflinching in its support of Israel, and instead used its influence to bring the conflict to an end.
There are two misconceptions here. The first is the premise: that the onus for the conflict and its perpetuation is entirely, percent on Israel. While it is true that Israel today has far more control over the conflict than do Palestinians, and thus bears more responsibility for its perpetuation, Palestinian groups are also plenty active in keeping the conflict going. It is a canard to argue that the conflict would end if only Israel withdrew from it unilaterally, because without an agreement with the Palestinians, Israel couldn't magically get groups like Hamas to give up on the conflict.
The main misconception, though, is the idea that the US is so unflinchingly pro-Israel, and such a crucial Israeli ally, that it is the de facto sponsor of the conflict, and thus could end the conflict by simply withdrawing its support for Israel. This is wrong on several levels. First, Israel was already engaged in the conflict before it enjoyed so much US support; the two countries had a poor relationship up until , before which Israel's lack of close American support did not stop it from occupying the Palestinian territories.
Second, the US and Israel since are not nearly as close as you might think; they bicker frequently and spy on one another openly. During the Obama and George H. Bush administrations, they reached points of overt antagonism. Third, while the US does provide Israel with an awful lot of military, financial, and diplomatic support, Israel has proven over and over again that this aid does not buy much real leverage on Israel-Palestine conflict issues.
Fourth, when the US has overtly pressured Israel on the conflict, as Obama did during his first term, Israel's response has often been to defy the US by doing the opposite of what is asked. There is a common view in the United States, on both the right and the left, that the US government gives Israel so much support because it loves and supports Israel's role in the conflict.
On the right, the view is that this policy is correct; on the left, the view is that it is a mistake and a result of pro-Israel lobbying or other distorting forces.
Both sides are wrong: the US position has long been and remains that supporting Israel is the only way to nudge the Israelis to the negotiating table, and to make democratically elected Israeli leaders feel politically secure enough that they will take the necessary risks for peace. This is the same reason the US gives heavy financial and political support to the Palestinian Authority.
There is a valid case to be made that the high level of American support for Israel does, to some extent, enable its policies in the conflict. There is also a valid case, though, that withdrawing American support would make Israelis and their leaders feel more threatened and isolated, thus empowering anti-peace politics and making peace that much less likely. Either way, it is not the case that American support for Israel is so overwhelmingly decisive that switching it off would end the conflict.
There's a popular view among Americans that Palestinians have rejected nonviolent resistance, and that if only they took up the lessons of nonviolent Indian independence leader Mohandas Gandhi, then that would bring the conflict to an end. Logically, this is a confusing argument. It assumes that Israel is driving the conflict, as the British did by colonizing India, while simultaneously putting the onus for ending it on Palestinians.
It also conveniently overlooks, as Westerners often do, the fact that Gandhi was an outlier. Most colonial-era independence leaders to some extent endorsed violence, including South Africa's Nelson Mandela.
More fundamentally, though, this is wrong because there are lots of Palestinians who have used, and continue to use, nonviolence to organize against the Israeli occupation.
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