Who is hobbes and rousseau

Show Summary Details. Subscriber Login Email Address. Password Please enter your Password. Library Card Please enter your library card number. Contents Go to page:. View: no detail some detail full detail. Review and Conclusion. End Matter Bibliography Index. All rights reserved. But much of human history has been war-torn, and unhappily there are still many people who live in states ravaged by conflict and war — in such cases, Hobbes speaks through the ages.

Rousseau thought not, and accused Hobbes of mistaking the characteristics of his own society for timeless insights into our nature. On the Hobbesian analysis, an authoritative political state is the answer to the problem of our naturally self-interested and competitive nature. Rousseau viewed things differently and instead argued that we are only self-interested and competitive now because of the way that modern societies have developed. For Rousseau, everything started to go wrong once humans perfected the arts of agriculture and industry, which eventually led to unprecedented levels of private property, economic interdependence, and inequality.

Inequality breeds social division. Where societies had once been united by strong social bonds, the escalation of inequality soon turned us into ruthless competitors for status and domination. In his secularised retelling of the Fall, the advent of economic inequality takes the place of our ejection from the Garden of Eden.

It remains one of the most powerful indictments of modern society in the history of western thought. Rousseau thought that once human nature has been corrupted the chances for redemption are vanishingly slight. This way of putting things adds a twist to the usual narrative, where Hobbes is supposed to be the pessimist, and Rousseau the optimist.

If you think that modern life is characterised by self-interest and competition, then one response is to sit back and wonder at how such individualistic creatures ever managed to form peaceful societies. Hobbes saw societies divided by war and offered a road to peace.

These rival perspectives still divide the world today. Has capitalism turned us into enemies who endlessly compete with one another for profit and prestige, or has it discovered a relatively benign way of co-ordinating the activities of millions of people across any given state without degenerating into conflict? And on that question, it is Rousseau — not Hobbes — who gives us the most reason to despair. This article and thousands of others like it.

Subscribe now and get your first month free. Continue Reading. Already a subscriber? There exists however a fundamental difference between them on the issue of sovereignty. Whereas Rousseau separates the sovereign from the government, Hobbes does not. Rousseau insists that sovereignty always resides with the people as a whole and government is only legitimate, that is, only exerts power legitimately, to the extent that it is the agent of the people as they express themselves through the general will.

Hobbes, on the other hand, associates sovereignty with government itself and wants to make government as centralized and powerful as possible. Underlying this basic difference is Rousseau's insistence that civil society must be based upon preservation of everyone's freedom and equality in contrast with Hobbes' insistence that civil society must be based upon power and fear. On an even deeper level, their opposition results from differing conceptions of human nature: Rousseau's basic trust in human beings and his desire for their possessing freedom of expression in contrast with Hobbes' declaration that human beings are so aggressive and power-seeking that an overwhelming power must exist to keep them in check, if we want to live in peace.

For Hobbes, avoiding a state of civil war, the worst possible catastrophe, is always the foremost goal; for Rousseau, the preservation of human freedom and equality, without which we cannot maintain our humanity, is the foremost goal. As we might expect then, there is considerable difference between them as to what subjects should be willing to "put up with" from their government.

We can also see why European heads of state shuddered at the thought of The Social Contract. Rousseau would reject the coercive element associated with Hobbes' view of the social contract. Hobbes stresses the point that subjects enter into the commonwealth out of a sense of fear, so much so that it makes no difference in our obligations to the sovereign whether we entered through a voluntary assembly or through the fact of being conquered.

Rousseau, on the other hand, asserts that our obedience to a conqueror should last only until the time we can escape from or overcome the usurper's power. Moreover, Rousseau thinks that, in entering the social contract from a state of nature, we exchange elements of natural freedom for civil and moral freedom; and we cannot assign this worthwhile exchange simply to the motivation of fear. Another difference arises with respect to self-preservation. In Hobbes' view, we can never surrender the right of self-preservation in civil society because it is the basic reason for our entering into civil society in the first place.

Accordingly, we have a right to defend ourselves if the sovereign attacks us, even if we had committed murder; we also have the right to meet our obligations to the common defense in wartime by sending a substitute who is willing to fight for us. Rousseau however does not grant so inclusive a right to self-preservation. If we are willing to let others die to defend us, then we must also sometimes be willing to die to defend others; and if we accept a law requiring the death penalty for murderers as a way of protecting ourselves from being murdered, then we should also consent to die should we ourselves become murderers.

From Rousseau's standpoint, Hobbes' commonwealth establishes a state of slavery for subjects, a state unfit for human beings. Instead of government serving the people, the rulers will sacrifice the people for the sake of their private interests. Hobbes, on the other hand, would regard Rousseau's social contract as a delusionary vision. Instead of a society functioning according to the general will, we would end up with chaos and civil war.

Both Hobbes and Rousseau attribute the origin of civil society to voluntary agreements entered into by its members. Unfortunately, this voluntary agreement is a misleading myth. Habit, convenience, social training, economic status, and social circumstance have far more to do with the explanation why persons accept authority in a society than any alleged voluntariness.

While the more heroic members of the populace may exhibit voluntariness, the overwhelming majority will resign themselves to accept a particular form of authority rather than choose it. Faced with perceived dissatisfaction or injustice, the overwhelming majority lack both the resources and the resourcefulness to move elsewhere. Even when some new form of government is instituted, the average person has little to choose with respect to its makeup. In some very abstract sense, of course, everyone makes some choice and even resignation is a choice of sorts.

But to associate such minimal choices with the voluntary agreements that supposedly establish civil society, as Hobbes and Rousseau maintain, distorts the meaning of "voluntariness" and distracts attention from the socio-economic conditions that produce dissatisfaction and injustice. Instead of focusing on a mythical "social contract" as a way of guaranteeing rights, we should change the underlying conditions that produce misery.

A Possible Reply: Whether or not voluntary entrance into a social contract is a specific, noteworthy historical event in the life-history of a nation is not a crucial issue. What is most important is the granting of natural, unalienable rights to every individual and the forming of a civil society in accord with those rights.

A civil society so constituted assures both satisfaction and justice to its members; hence it has the implied consent of its members even without the specific act of entering into the social contract voluntarily. While this specific act may indeed he desirable as a clear signification of the social bond, it is not necessary. The social contract is neither mythical nor misleading nor meaningless. It signifies that civil society is in accordance with the natural rights of individuals and thus that the society has an organizational structure worthy of voluntary allegiance and consent.

Those who heed Lord Acton's dictum, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," will remain unimpressed by Hobbes' assurance that subjects have nothing to fear from the absolute power of a monarch, because of the realization that the greater strength and well-being of subjects furthers the monarch's own private interests. The absolute power of dictators has a way of corrupting even the best of intentions and of creating misery for subjects. For precisely these reasons, subjects demand some check on the accumulation of power by any one governmental official.

Hobbes wants absolute, centralized power in the state so that the subjects may be protected from their own aggressiveness; the subjects however want protection from a dictator so that they may be protected from abuse of power. The real solution to the problem consists in instituting a system of checks and balances whereby government has sufficient force to control any aggressiveness at the same time that power is sufficiently diffused to prevent any particular governmental official from accumulating enough personal power to abuse subjects.

Hobbes thinks that the diffusion of power merely produces a tendency toward chaos and the pursuit of private interests by governmental officials. When a system of checks and balances works properly however, the tendency to pursue private interests instead of' the common interest by one official is checked by the power of other officials.

The system may be less orderly than Hobbes would like. But at least subjects do not suffer under the unchecked aberrations of a dictator. A Possible Reply: The greatest threat to a society is not the "aberrations of a dictator" but rather the disintegration of the state itself into a condition of war.

Subjects can endure the temporary abuses of a single dictator better than they can survive and enjoy war. If a particular monarch fails to see the identity between private interest and well-being of the commonwealth as a whole, we have no sound reason to think that successors to the sovereign power will be similarly blind.

Rather than taking steps likely to plunge people into a state of war, subjects should take their chances even with a cruel dictator, with the hope that they can expect more enlightenment in a successor. Despite Rousseau's declarations in favor of human freedom and equality, he lays out a system that easily lends itself to totalitarianism. His concept of the "general will" is the tool that makes totalitarianism possible.

The general will makes possible the suppression of minorities under the guise of "forcing them to be free. According to Rousseau, if private interests predominate, then the vote of the majority may not be truly an expression of the general will. Rousseau also asserts that "[the public] must be taught to know what it wills.

We can easily imagine how an aspiring dictator or totalitarian group could use these notions to destroy the people's freedom and equality. The basis for suppressing minorities, for rejecting the will of the majority, for controlling what people think, and for usurping power under the guise of a "crisis" is readily at hand. To be sure, Rousseau does not desire a totalitarian state. He genuinely believes that the imposition of the general will upon unwilling minorities leads them to do what they "really" want; he genuinely hopes that the vote of the majority coincides with the general will; he genuinely demands a lawgiver who "enlightens" the people without possessing legislative or executive power; and he insists upon the "temporary" nature of any suspension of sovereign authority.

Unfortunately, Rousseau fails to take account of the real world. Totalitarian governments are very adept at extending the period of a crisis; they insist upon retaining for themselves, with their considerable power, the task of "enlightening the public;" they find excuses for denying the will of the majority; and they offer self-serving interpretations of what the people "really" want. A Possible Reply: Any ambiguities that may arise with respect to determining the general will should not sustain for any length of time the legitimacy of a totalitarian government.

The usurping of the people's sovereignty cannot be hidden for long. And as soon as the usurpation is evident, the government is no longer entitled to the obedience of subjects. Far from establishing a framework for totalitarianism, Rousseau shows instead why totalitarian governments have no legitimacy. Civil society only makes sense if it is organized to serve the common interest. A "society" organized to serve private interests is not really a civil society at all.

The concept of the "general will" provides a means of stating what the common interest is. Rousseau is well aware that, in practice, the common interest is served, or the general will is expressed, in varying degrees. In addition to analyzing the nature of civil society, Rousseau issues a warning: Civil society tends toward disintegration as the common interest is less well-served.

Hence, the general will is not some occult notion appealing to mystics; rather, it is a practical way of grasping what holds a healthy, civil society together. Rousseau's vision of a society where simple, straightforward people are "difficult to deceive because of their very simplicity," where peasants always act wisely, where few laws are necessary, and where the need for a new law is readily obvious to all has little to do with the real world. The overwhelming majority of people lack the ability, wisdom, and dedication to assert sovereign authority responsibly in the assemblies Rousseau envisions.

Although Rousseau's romantic vision may well please us, we should also recognize its impracticality. Rousseau's contention that charges of impracticality are attributable to "glib theorizers" who only look at badly constituted states is very weak.

We have only to look at Rousseau's own catalog of dangers mentioned above to realize that the real world, not the misperceptions of glib theorizers, establishes the impracticality of his vision of the state. A Possible Reply: To focus upon impracticality as this objection does, a person must lose sight of the basic issue of the social contract.

Rousseau wants to show that the social contract is only legitimate if it accomplishes a necessary objective, namely, the preservation of human freedom and equality through expression of the general will.

No other alternative is available. Hence, while a list of practical dangers can warn us about what to avoid in order to preserve the social contract, it cannot establish the impracticality of Rousseau's conception of sovereignty, because the admission of impracticality is a denial of the possibility of civil society.

In other words, regardless of' practical difficulties, we should strive to accomplish what Rousseau advocates because his position is the only one that establishes legitimate grounds for a civil society. Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. Censors should be appointed while the laws are in their vigour; for when they have fallen into decay, all is over; nothing justifiable can have force when the laws have lost it. The business of censorship is to preserve morality by preventing the opinions of men from being corrupted, to maintain their integrity by judicious aids, and sometimes even to fix opinions when they waver.

Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. IV, Ch. Problem: In the United States today, some groups actively advocate censorship of what is taught in schools or available in libraries or shown on TV.

They want censorship to avoid what they see as a decline in the nation's morality, particularly with respect to the corruption of young people. To what extent, if any, would Hobbes and Rousseau support their efforts? The passages quoted above show that neither Hobbes nor Rousseau opposes censorship as a matter of principle. Each thinks that censorship serves an important function within society.

Each would probably also grant the importance to society of the topics mentioned. In Hobbes' case, the sovereign is the ultimate judge of what should be censored. Thus, although these groups may present their case for censorship to the sovereign or a designated representative, they are obligated to abide by the sovereign's decision. Accordingly, in the case of a decision against censorship, they must cease their activities rather than holding rallies, harassing officials, or taking political power into their own hands.

They cannot appeal to an alleged higher authority such as conscience or God. Note also that the standard of judgment in censorship cases, for Hobbes, is the preservation of peace.

As a result, matters requiring the censoring judgment of the sovereign arise only to the extent that they threaten the peace of the commonwealth. Hence some issues that bother groups in the United States today may not warrant action by the sovereign because they pose no threat to peace. Regarding the possibility that the sovereign's censoring power may prevent true doctrines from being known, Hobbes takes the position that preserving peace and promoting true doctrines are so compatible that a sovereign has nothing to gain from censoring what is true.

Even if, through poor governance, censorship leads to acceptance of false doctrines, subjects are still better off with false doctrines than with rapid promotion of new truths that upset the peace and challenge the sovereign's authority. In Rousseau's case, any censorship must express the judgment of the people. Accordingly, public officials exceed their authority if they censor at their own personal discretion; and factions have no right to impose their group's beliefs on a whole society, no matter how convinced they are of the rightness of their views.

In cases where groups in the United States advocate censorship then, Rousseau would first want to determine whether they express the people's judgment or the judgment of some faction. Although these groups may well be very active and effective in promoting their views, they do not necessarily express the people's judgment. Also Rousseau would want to determine whether any proposed censorship will be a preventive, or corrective, measure.

He has no confidence in the effectiveness of censorship as a corrective measure once the level or morality has declined.

New laws will not restore morality when respect for the old laws is lacking. For Rousseau, respect for law, a sense of public spiritedness, and a high moral tone are precious commodities in a society that, once squandered away, cannot be replaced or restored through strict enforcement of more laws. Thus, to the extent that groups advocating censorship see their efforts as a restoration of a lost morality, they will not find much comfort in Rousseau's position on censorship.

Neither Hobbes nor Rousseau places any limit upon what subject matter may be censored. Neither recognizes an unalienable right to free speech or a free press. On the other hand, each wants to avoid censorship based upon caprice or prejudice, Hobbes by using the preservation of peace as the overriding standard of judgment and Rousseau by using the people's will.

On the whole, groups advocating censorship in the United States today can take some comfort in the fact that both Hobbes and Rousseau advocated censorship; but they cannot presume that Hobbes and Rousseau agree with their views of what should be censored. Further Thought: Of the topics listed earlier as prime targets for censorship, which do you think that Hobbes or Rousseau would include as likely candidates for censorship? Which do you think they would exclude?

Do you find Hobbes' and Rousseau's justifications for censorship convincing? Do they have adequate ways of assuring that censorship does not go too far? Would you personally find their positions on censorship threatening? Under what conditions, if any, would you advocate censorship in society? Given Rousseau's view that censorship cannot restore morality and generalizing the point he makes on this issue, do you think that Rousseau would support a "law and order" approach as a way of restoring traditional values in your nation today?

Why should you answer, "No"? If Rousseau is correct, what alternatives are open to people in a society: Should they accept inevitable decline? Reorganize the society with a new social contract? Eliminate the social conditions which corrupted the people's public spiritedness? Do think that human beings really possess such a right?

How does Hobbes guarantee that persons cannot justify casting off their allegiance to the sovereign, except for extreme circumstances? Why does Hobbes think that his view of sovereignty will avoid a state of war? Do you agree with him? How is the right of nature relevant to establishing many of these liberties?

Would you be satisfied to live in a commonwealth with these liberties'? How sound is his reasoning? Do you think that a subject's suit would get a fair hearing when it is the sovereign who appoints the judges? Do citizens with a complaint against government agencies or officials get a fair hearing in contemporary society?

Are these conditions too broad? Too narrow? If the conditions are too narrow, what additional ones would you add'? Then evaluate the following refutation of his position: Governments such as those in Great Britain and the United States have existed for centuries with many of the debilitating threats Hobbes warns against.

Yet the governments have survived.